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Introduction 
In recent decades problems and damages related to Aquatic Nuisance Species 
(ANSs) have triggered increasing research efforts by physical scientists and economists 
alike.  However, as synthesized in Lowell et al. (2006), published economic studies with 
reference to ANSs have to date primarily concentrated on broader issues related to trade 
and international economic policy (e.g.  Costello and McAusland, 2004, Margolis et al., 
2005, Costello et al., 2007) or use ANSs as an example to calibrate broader bio-economic 
models of invasive species management (e.g. Leung et al., 2002, Moore et al., 2006, 
Finoff et al., 2006).   
In contrast, there exist few studies that examine ANS management policies from 
an empirical perspective based on primary data of economic activities and choices. 
Notable exceptions are Lupi et al. (2003) who use a random utility model of recreational 
fishing to estimate the benefits of Sea Lamprey control to Michigan anglers, and Nunes 
and Bergh (2004), who apply a travel cost model of beach visitation in Holland to 
estimate the welfare losses due to beach closures related to harmful algal bloom.  This 
study contributes to this sparse empirical literature by providing estimates of economic 
welfare losses to anglers from a variety of management scenarios to combat the New 
Zealand Mud Snail (NZMS). 
The NZMS (Potamopyrgus antipodarum), while present in the U.S. since the 
1980s, has enjoyed much less media and research coverage than other, more prominent, 
ANSs, such as the Zebra Mussel (Dreissena polymorpha) and its close relative, the 
Quagga Mussel (Dreissena rostriformis bugensis).  This is likely due to the fact that the 2 
 
detrimental economic impacts of the latter two species have become evident relatively 
quickly after their introduction to the Unites States, while the effects of the NZMS on 
human economic production or activities have to date been less obvious and pronounced.  
In fact, there still exists much uncertainty surrounding the NZMS in all stages of typical 
ANS research, from the identification of pathways and vectors, to ecological impacts and 
methods of prevention, detection, and control (Proctor et al., 2007).  As a result, agencies 
are still far from converging towards optimal management strategies. 
However, experts agree that the NZMS has the potential to severely impact 
freshwater fisheries (e.g. Cada et al., 2003, Cada, 2004, Proctor et al., 2007), and that 
recreational access restrictions might be considered as a management strategy to avoid a 
further spread of the snail (Proctor et al., 2007).  In fact, temporary site closures have 
already been implemented in some cases to quarantine infested waters (California 
Department of Fish and Game, 2004).   
Economists can contribute to the development of informed management strategies  
by shedding light on the economic impact of potential changes in fishery regulations and 
access.  Specifically, given adequate underlying data of consumer behavior, economists 
can provide estimates of expected welfare losses to recreationists and expenditure losses 
to the local economy from reduced visitation due to restrictions on site use or access.  At 
the very least, this allows agencies to rank sites and prioritize interventions based on 
economic sensitivity, ceteris paribus.  In a climate of pronounced scientific uncertainty, 
this is – at the margin – a very valuable degree of freedom.  In addition, a better 
knowledge of possible economic losses enables agencies to more accurately assess the 3 
 
expected net benefits from public outreach and education campaigns, widely considered 
the most viable – and perhaps only – option to curb the spread of the Snail (Proctor et al., 
2007). 
This study focuses on the Truckee / Carson / Walker (TCW) watershed along the 
Northern Nevada – California border in the Lake Tahoe Region.  This is an ideal research 
area with respect to the NZMS for several reasons: (i) It is an important recreational 
fishery to locals and visitors alike; (ii) There are to date no documented occurrences of 
the NZMS in the TCW system, and resource managers still have the option to invest in 
preemptive strategies; and (iii) Several nearby creeks and angling destinations are already 
infested, thus there is an imminent threat to the system of a near-future infestation.  As a 
result, local managing agencies are under considerable pressure to decide on budget 
allocations for public outreach and awareness campaigns. 
We use visitation data for 2004 Nevada fishing license holders to estimate a 
multi-site demand model of trip counts to 12 segments of the TCW system.  We cast our 
analysis in a hierarchical Bayesian econometric framework to circumvent the need to 
approximate multi-dimensional integrals, and to allow for variation in angler preferences 
related to fishing regulations and access restrictions.  We examine the economic impact 
of stricter fishing regulations, winter closures, and seasonal closures at some or all 
segments.  We find that such intervention can lead to system-wide welfare losses of $10 - 
$30 million per year, depending on the policy scenario.  In addition, there may be annual 
losses of angler expenditures to the local economy in the amount of $5 -$10 million.  
These figures clearly justify considerable preemptive expenditures by agencies on public 4 
 
education and outreach.  To our knowledge this is the first economic study with specific 
focus on the NZMS. 
The remainder of this manuscript is structured as follows: The next section 
describes the NZMS threat to the Western U.S., the TCW river system, and the current 
state of feasible management strategies.  Section III outlines the utility-theoretic and 
econometric modeling framework.  Section IV describes the data set and presents 
estimation results and predicted economic impacts. Concluding remarks are given in 
Section V. 
 
II) Background Information 
The NZMS in the Western U.S. 
The New Zealand Mud Snail is an invasive freshwater species with tremendous 
reproductive potential.  It can overtake and degrade entire ecosystems through its 
competition with native invertebrates for habitat and food sources.  It was first discovered 
in the mid-Snake River in Idaho in the 1980s, and has since rapidly spread to other 
watersheds in ten Western States, including three National Parks.  Colonies of NZMSs 
have been reported to reach densities as high as 750,000 / m
2  in suitable habitats 
comprising over 95% of the invertebrate biomass in a water body (Department of 
Ecology, Montana State University, 2005).  These impressive rates of proliferation are 
largely attributable to the absence of specific parasites that curb the snail's spread in its 
native New Zealand waters. Furthermore, the snail is largely indigestible to potential 
predators.   5 
 
Given the snail's documented competitive edge for habitat and food at the 
detriment of traditional food sources for trout and other game fish, and its own poor 
nutritional value to these fish populations, the arrival of the NZMS has naturally triggered 
strong concerns regarding the future health of affected fisheries. While more research is 
needed to gain clarity on the impacts of NZMS infestations on the vertebrate fauna, 
preliminary scientific findings indicate that large densities of mud snails can lead to a 
reduced growth in fishes (Cada et al., 2003).  As stated in Richards (2002) and in various 
agency outlets (e.g.  Colorado Division of Wildlife, 2005,  Proctor et al., 2007), it is the 
general consensus amongst scientists and water managers that the NZMS, if left 
unchecked, will have a significant and potentially permanent negative impact on western 
fisheries. 
The NZMS threat is aggravated by the fact that these invaders are very small 
(generally less than 1/8 inch), and can survive for long periods of time in moist 
environments.  These characteristics facilitate the spread of the snail across watersheds 
through human activities as the snail can become an undetected "hitchhiker" on 
watercraft and fishing gear.  The NZMS's distribution through human vectors is now 
widely considered the main reason for the snail's rapid inter-shed spread in recent years 
(National Park Service, 2003, Proctor et al., 2007).   
As is evident from Figure 1 the snail has arrived in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
in aquatic systems near the northeastern and southeastern corners of Nevada, and near 
Nevada’s southwestern border with California. These infected waters include primary 
recreation destinations, such as the American River between Lake Tahoe and 6 
 
Sacramento, the Owens River along Nevada’s western border with California, and Lake 
Mead near the city of Las Vegas.  All of these destinations are located within driving 
distance from the TCW watershed. 
 
The Truckee / Carson / Walker River Watershed 
The TCW system is shown in Figure 2.  As is evident from the figure, the Truckee 
River, labeled by the letter “T”, emerges from Lake Tahoe’s eastern shore in California 
and empties into Pyramid Lake in the Great Basin for a total length of 140 miles.  It 
traverses the Reno / Sparks urban area, which has a population of approximately 350,000 
residents.   
The Carson River’s East and West forks both originate in the California Sierras 
south of Lake Tahoe.  The two forks join in Nevada, run through the State’s capital of 
Carson City (pop. 55,000) and feed into Lake Lahontan, a reservoir for irrigation and 
hydro-electricity, and a popular summer destination for campers and boaters.  The total 
length of the Carson River is approximately 150 miles.  The Carson River carries the 
letter “C” in Figure 2.   
The 50-mile long Walker River, labeled as “W” in the figure, is located just south 
of the Carson system.  It also originates in two forks.  The West Walker River emerges 
from the California Sierras, while the East Walker River constitutes the outflow of 
Bridgeport Reservoir, also located in California.  The West Walker feeds into Topaz 
Lake at the California-Nevada border, then joins its Eastern counterpart to continue to 
Walker Lake, another terminal lake in the Great Basin.   7 
 
Over the last 15-20 years the TCW watershed has received an annual average of 
over 16,000 visitors for a total of over 150,000 fishing days per year (Moeltner, 2006).  
Considering average per-day expenditures of $50-60 for the prototypical visitor, the total 
annual revenue to the local economy from TCW anglers amounts to $7.5 -9 million 
(Moeltner, 2006).  Thus, based on expenditures alone, the TCW fishery constitutes an 
important economic resource to the Region.  To date, no occurrence of the NZMS has 
been reported for the TCW watershed. 
For the purpose of this study we divide each river into four segments, as shown in 
the figure.  The segments were primarily chosen based on differences in current fishing 
regulations.  As captured in Table 1 this provides for an interesting mix of winter closures 
and bag / size / lure restrictions across segments.  
 
Policy Options 
Ecologists generally distinguish between two types of managerial interventions 
with respect to invasive species: prevention and control (e.g. Finoff et al., 2007). 
Preventative measures are those that aim to block the arrival of a nuisance species at a yet 
uninfested ecosystem, while control measures are geared towards curbing population 
growth or reducing the population of an invasive species after its arrival.  There are 
several theoretical economic contributions that address the issue of how scarce agency 
resources should be divided between these two strategies (e.g. Leung et al., 2002, Olson 
and Roy, 2003, Finoff et al., 2007).  Not surprisingly, the identification of an optimal 8 
 
course of actions hinges both on the knowledge of the economic costs and on the 
probabilities associated with prevention, detection, control, and damages.   
As mentioned previously, in the case of the NZMS there still exists much 
uncertainty for virtually all of these components (Proctor et al., 2007).  However, there 
appears to be an emerging consensus amongst scientists that there may not exist any 
effective and environmentally safe control options to combat the snail after an infestation 
(Department of Ecology, Montana State University, 2005,  Proctor et al., 2007).  
Therefore, researchers are largely advocating investments in preemptive measures, 
especially via public outreach and education.  A recent report by the NZMS Management 
and Control Plan Working Group, prepared for the inter-agency Aquatic Nuisance 
Species Task Force (ANSTF), suggests several such measures.  These include the 
fostering of grassroots movements to educate recreationists on-site, awareness-raising via 
public announcements along identified pathways, and the integration of NZMS related 
topics into school programs (Proctor et al., 2007).   
If preemptive measures fail to protect a given ecosystem against the NZMS, 
available post-infestation management efforts may be limited to controlling human 
behavior to avoid a further spread, e.g. via vessel and gear inspections (currently 
implemented at Lake Tahoe, albeit with main focus on the Zebra and Quagga Mussels), 
enforced post-visit gear cleaning (the State of Montana has started to set up washing 
stations at infested fishing spots), and access restrictions (the State of California closed 
Putah Creek for several months in 2004 to study snail behavior and to raise public 
awareness,  California Department of Fish and Game, 2004).  For the purpose of this 9 
 
study, we will label such post-infestation interventions as pertaining to the “control” 
category, even though they are not directly aimed at a physical reduction of existing snail 
populations.   
For this study we consider the following control strategies: (i) Size / lure / bag 
restrictions, (ii) winter closures, (iii) both (i) and (ii), and (iv) complete year-round 
closure to access to.  The first three measures are envisioned as strategies to alleviate 
human pressure on Mud Snail-stressed fish populations, while the fourth could be 
implemented to hamper a further spread of the snail to other waters.  As shown in Section 
IV, each intervention generates pronouncedly different welfare effects for the underlying 
population of anglers. 
 
III) Modeling framework 
Utility-theoretic Framework 
  We aim to model trip demand for our 12-segment system of fishing destinations, 
allowing for demand changes at the extensive margin in reaction to policy interventions.  
This renders a generic Random Utility Framework (RUM), which implicitly conditions 
on a fixed total number of seasonal trips, unsuitable for our purpose.  An attractive 
alternative is the Incomplete Demand System (IDS) approach described in LaFrance and 
Hanemann (1989).  As discussed in von Haefen (2002), the IDS framework is well suited 
to analyzing consumer demand for a subset of goods (here a system of recreation sites) 
without resorting to restrictive aggregation and / or separability assumptions.  10 
 
We stipulate that angler i derives aggregate utility during a single fishing season 
from taking trips to the j =1...J-site recreation system, collected in vector yi, and from 
consuming a numeraire composite commodity b.  Specifically, 
( ) ,,,, i UU b = ij i yqs    (1) 
where qj denotes site attributes, and si is a vector of person or household characteristics.  
Utility maximization subject to an (assumed binding) budget constraint yields the 
Marshallian quasi-demand system 
( ) , i m = ii j i yy p , q , s    (2) 
where pi is a vector of prices associated with the destinations included in the system, and 
mi denotes annual income.  As shown in LaFrance and Hanemann (1989) these demand 
equations display, in theory, all desired utility-theoretic properties.  LaFrance and 
Hanemann (1994) illustrate how this framework can be empirically implemented for 
some common functional forms of demands.  Von Haefen (2002) further expands 
LaFrance’s set of IDS systems and provides detailed derivation of system components 
and system-specific parameter restrictions. 
We follow Hagerty and Moeltner (2005) and Shonkwiler and Englin (2005) and 
apply a Log I demand specification (model “(x5)” in von Haefen, 2002) within a count 
data framework.  This specific IDS version has performed well in similar applications 
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To assure symmetry of the Slutsky substitution matrix a permissible set of parameter 
restrictions is given by  , , mj m j β β =∀ , and  , 0, pj k kj β = ≠  (von Haefen, 2002 , p. 304).  
Shifting vector   comprises all site and respondent characteristics multiplied by their 
respective coefficients.  While these restrictions explicitly rule out cross-price effects in 
the uncompensated site-specific demand equations, they still allow for substitution effects 
between sites through compensated demands (Englin et al., 1998, Shonkwiler, 1999).   
ij a
  In addition to these restrictions the utility-theoretic properties of the IDS approach 
rest on the standard assumption that prices and quality attributes for other commodities 
(including other recreation sites) remain constant throughout the study period (Hanemann 
and Morey, 1992).   
 
Econometric framework 
As shown in Shonkwiler (1999) and Moeltner (2003) the Log I IDS can be 
embedded in a count data model of recreation trips by letting the right hand side of (3) be 
the parameterized expected value of a Poisson probability mass function, i.e.  
() ( ) , exp ij ij p j ij m i Ey pm λβ == ++ ij a β    (4) 
In addition, anglers’ trip demand to the 12 river segments likely also includes unobserved 
factors.  We need to accommodate this unobserved heterogeneity in our model to avoid 
misleading inferences with respect to policy interventions.  A common strategy taken in 
existing contributions in the context of count data modeling is to combine the link 
function for the Poisson distribution in (4) with a multiplicative error term, and to specify 12 
 
a J-dimensional multivariate density for the J-vector of site-specific errors (e.g. Egan and 
Herriges, 2003, Moeltner and Shonkwiler, forthcoming).   
In this study we take a different approach and model unobserved heterogeneity 
via a second-layer density for some of the parameters in the link function.  This has two 
main advantages over the multiplicative-error method: (i) It couples preference 
heterogeneity directly with specific site attributes, which is better aligned with our 
research focus, and (ii) it avoids the proliferation of parameters in the error variance 
matrix when J is large (as is the case in our application).  Otherwise, our model provides 
the same advantages as the multiplicative-error model by inducing statistical correlation 
of trip counts across sites for a given individual and by abrogating the restrictive mean-
variance equality of the basic Poisson model (for details see Egan and Herriges, 2003, 
and Moeltner and Shonkwiler, forthcoming). 
Specifically, we employ a hierarchical Poisson model with mixed effects, where 
some of the parameters in the link function remain fixed over all individuals, and others 
are allowed to vary randomly across anglers.  Collecting all fixed and random effects in 
parameter vectors  and  , respectively, and corresponding regressors in vectors  and 
, respectively, the model can be formally described as follows: 
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 (5) 
Thus, we stipulate that the vector of individual random effects,  , is drawn from a 




Labeling the number of random effects as  , this matrix will have  r k
( ) 1/ 2 rr kk + unrestricted parameters.  However, in our application  is considerably 
smaller than J, which supports our argument of parameter parsimony from above.  
Assuming independence of trip decisions across individuals the likelihood function for 
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i  (6) 
where N denotes the number of individuals in the sample.  
While this hierarchical Poisson-multinormal model is conceptually 
straightforward, its empirical implementation in a classical framework is somewhat 
cumbersome, as it requires the approximation of the  - dimensional integral over   in  r k i γ
(6).  This hurdle, coupled with the limited nature of the dependent variable, can make 
estimation via maximum likelihood techniques (MLE) quite challenging.  We thus follow 
Chib et al. (1998) and Jochmann and Léon-González (2004) and take a Bayesian 
estimation approach via Gibbs Sampling to implement this model.  To our knowledge 
this is the first application of a hierarchical Bayesian count data model to the analysis of 
recreation demand. 
A Bayesian approach requires the specification of priors for all model parameters.  
We choose the standard “convenience” priors that, when combined with the likelihood 
function, yield tractable conditional posteriors.  Specifically, we choose multivariate 
normal priors for  and   and an inverse Wishart (IW) prior for the elements of  , i.e.  β γ Σ14 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ~, , ~, , ~ , mvn mvn IW v ββ γγ 0 βμ V γμ V Σ S ,  (7) 
where   and   are the degrees of freedom and scale matrix, respectively.  The IW 
density is parameterized such that  .   
0 v 0 S
()()
1
0 1 r Ek ν
− =− − 0 Σ S
The posterior simulator (Gibbs Sampler) draws from the following conditional 
densities: 
( ) ( )
() ( )
[]
|,,,, , |,,,, ,
|, , a n d     | , , ,,, , 1 w h e r e
pp
pp i N =
′ ′′ ′ =
iiii
12 N






The ability to draw  and  conditional on the N sets of   preempts the need to 
approximate the integral in the likelihood function.  The draws of   and 
 require Metropolis-Hastings (MH) sub-routines within the Gibbs 
Sampler.  Posterior inference is based on the marginals of the joint posterior distribution 
.  The detailed steps of the posterior simulator for this model are given 
in Chib et al. (1998).  The Matlab code to implement this model is available from the 
authors upon request. 
,, βγ Σ i γ
|,, ,, β yXHΣΓ
|,,, , , iiii γ yXHβΣΓ




The posterior sampler generates r=1…R draws of parameters.  To derive posterior 
predictive distributions (PPDs) of trip counts and welfare measures these draws need to 
be combined with specific settings for individual characteristics and site attributes.  Let 
( ,| , g ij ij i xhθγ  be some posterior measure of interest for some settings of regressors 15 
 
ij x and  , conditional on model parameters θand random effects  .  To properly 
average this measure over all combinations of  and  observed in our sample (and 
presumably present in the underlying population in similar proportions), we compute 
ij h i γ









= ∑ i ) j ij i xhθ γ  for each draw of  and  .  The unconditional posterior predictive 
density for this sample-weighted measure of interest can then be expressed as 
θ i γ
() () () () ( )
1
1
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θγ
xh x h θγ γ Σ γ θyXH θ γ  (9)  p
In practice, draws from this PPD are obtained in straightforward fashion as follows:  
1.  For a given draw of  obtain several, say , draws of random vector  .  For each 
draw of   compute the sample-averaged measure of interest, i.e. 










= ∑ ij ij i xhθ γ . 
2.  Repeat step (1) for all R draws of θfrom the original Gibbs Sampler. 
The resulting PPD, based on the  2 * R r  draws of  ( ) , g xh , can then be examined with 
respect to its statistical properties.  We follow this procedure for different specifications 
of  ( ,| , g i ) j ij i xhθγ , as described below in more detail. 
 
IV) Empirical Application 
Data 
The data for this analysis stem from a combined mail / internet survey of 2004 
annual Nevada fishing license holders residing in Nevada and California Counties 16 
 
surrounding the TCW watershed.  This target population constitutes 80-90% of all 
anglers at the three rivers (Moeltner, 2006).  Each respondent was given the option to 
complete the survey online or via mail.  The survey was implemented in five rounds 
during the period of November 2005 to February, 2006, following the "best science" 
methodology described in Dillman (2000). 
  The initial round of questionnaires was mailed to 1800 anglers, randomly chosen 
from a sample frame of 28,331 individuals.  This target sample count was then adjusted 
for rounds 2 and 3 of the survey based on responses to previous rounds and attrition due 
to undeliverable addresses.  Response rates in terms of targeted anglers were in the 20 % 
range for the first two rounds and declined to approximately 11% for round 3.  The total 
percentage of undeliverable surveys is in the expected range of 10 – 20% for a relative 
transient area such as Reno / Sparks / Carson City.  Overall, 751 completed surveys were 
returned for an overall response rate of close to 50%.  Approximately 9% of respondents 
used the internet version of the survey.   
  The survey was structured into four sections.  The firsts section asked respondents 
about their general fishing experience and preferences, including fishing technique (fly 
fishing vs. spin casting), tendency to keep or release caught fish, and the relative 
importance of different fishing site attributes and fishing regulations.  Section 2 asked 
anglers about their awareness of the NZMS threat to the TCW system, as well as any 
preemptive actions they took or are planning to take to avoid an infestation, such as 
chemically treating or drying fishing gear after an angling trip.  The third section inquired 
about their history for 2004 day-trips trips to each of the 12 river segments shown in 17 
 
Figure 2.  The last section collected some basic demographic information, including 
education and income levels.  The questionnaire is available from the authors upon 
request. 
For this analysis we further narrowed the sample to those respondents who (i) 
lived no more than 200 miles from the nearest river segment (given our focus in day 
trips) , and (ii) provided all necessary socio-demographic information, most notably their 
annual household income.  This led to a final useable sample of 551 individuals and 551 
x 12 = 6612 observations on day-trip counts. 
  Some salient summary statistics for this sample are given in Table 2.  With 
respect to demographic characteristics we observe that older, male anglers, residing in 
Nevada, dominate the sample.  These anglers are also more affluent than the population 
at large (for comparison, the median household income in Nevada in 2007 was $49,288 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 ) .  In contrast, the average years of schooling appears to be 
comparable to State-wide levels (for comparison, in 2000, 81% of adult Nevadans had 
completed high school, and close to 20% had a Bachelor degree or higher). 
The fact that recreational fishing has traditionally been a popular sport in this 
region is highlighted by the close-to-40-years of fishing experience for the average angler 
in our sample.  The majority of anglers use both spin casting and fly fishing techniques.  
Approximately a third also held a California fishing license in 2004.  Importantly for our 
policy focus, a considerable segment of anglers prefer sites with no bag or lure 
restrictions.   18 
 
With respect to the NZMS threat, only slightly more than a fourth of anglers were 
aware of the snail at the time of the survey.  Close to a fifth of the sample had also fished 
waters with known infestations of the NZMS in 2004, and over half of the respondents 
stated that they generally use wading as a fishing strategy.   Together, these findings 
stress the imminence of the NZMS threat to the TCW system, and the pressing need to 
enhance public awareness.  
As is evident from the last row of the table, the average angler in our sample 
spends approximately $65 on a day-long fishing trip on items such as gasoline, food and 
beverages, and fishing supplies.  As stated earlier in the text, this underlines the 
importance of the TCW fishery to the local economy.   
Table 3 provides a summary of travel distances and trip counts.  Distances were 
computed for the shortest possible travel route from a respondent’s ZIP code centroid to 
the nearest road access point for each river section using GIS techniques.  The details of 
this process are available from the authors upon request.  For the four longest river 
segments (T4, C4, and W4) distances were computed to four separate access points per 
segment.  For a given respondent, we then used that person’s preferred access point 
(elicited in the survey), or, if no preference was given, an average of the four distances 
for further analysis. 
As captured in the first four columns of the table, the prototypical angler travelled 
approximately 50-70 miles to reach a specific segment on the Truckee or Carson, and 80-
100 miles to fish at the Walker River.  The longer distances to the Walker River are 19 
 
expected, given the relative remoteness of this destination from the Reno / Sparks 
population hub.  
The remainder of the table depicts trip counts to the 12 segments at both 
individual and total levels.  Clearly, the Truckee section T4, flowing directly through the 
Reno / Sparks urban area, receives by far the highest visitation counts (66% of all trips to 
the Truckee, and 39% of all trips to the system).  Similarly, the longer downstream 
sections with general regulations were also the most popular in 2004 for the Carson and 
Walker Rivers, with 54% and 39% of river-specific visits, respectively.  Overall, the 
Truckee River received close to 60% of all visits to the system, with the remaining 40% 
divided approximately equally between the other two waterways.   
The average angler took slightly over 6 trips to the system, with some individuals 
visiting certain segments over 200 times during the season.  While this may seem 
excessive, it should be noted that for many residents in the Reno / Sparks or Carson City 
communities accessing one of the TCW rivers implies little more than a walk across their 
backyard, and daily angling outings are not uncommon for our target population.  In 
general, we observe considerable variability in trip counts within and across sites, which 
aids in the identification of our model parameters.  
 
Estimation results 
  We implement our Hierarchical Mixed-effects Poisson model using the following 
demographic regressors:  gender (1=female), age, age squared, household income (in 
$1000), and an indicator set to one if the respondent’s household includes children, and 20 
 
set to zero otherwise.  The remaining respondent-specific explanatory variables are 
indicators for “fly fishing only” and “spin casting only”, respectively, plus fishing 
experience, in years. Site-specific information enters the model via indicators for “special 
regulations” and “winter closure”, respectively, as discussed above and captured in Table 
1. Together, these regressors, plus a common constant term, comprise the elements of the 
shifting vector  in our Log 1 IDS in  ij a (3).   
  The IDS specification is completed by adding separate price terms for each of the 
12 segments.  These prices are computed in standard fashion (e.g. Moeltner, 2003, 
Hagerty and Moeltner, 2005) by multiplying the round-trip distance in miles by an 
automotive cost factor (we choose $0.3) and adding a time-cost component, derived as 
driving time in hours (we assume an average speed of 45mph) times 1/3 * hourly wage.  
For anglers who did not hold an annual fishing license for California, and who visited 
segments located in California we add that State’s daily fishing fee in 2004 of $10 to their 
travel cost.  
We allow for unobserved heterogeneity of anglers’ reaction to special regulations 
and winter closures and pair these two regressors with random coefficients.  Thus, these 
two variables form the contents of vector  in  ij h (5).  The remaining regressors are 
collected in the vector of fixed effects,  .    ij x
We estimate all models using the following vague but proper parameter settings 
for our priors:    and  0 0, =10, 2, r vk == = == βγ βγ μμ VV =
r 0k SI . We use multivariate t-
distributions as tailored proposal densities in our MH algorithms for draws of  and    β i γ21 
 
(Chib et al., 1998).  The tuner elements for these t-distributions are the degrees of 
freedom, and a scalar for the variance matrix.  For draws of βwe set the degrees of 
freedom to 8, and the variance scalar to 1.5.  For draws of   we choose 8 and 2, 
respectively, for these two tuning elements.  These setting led to acceptance rates of 
approximately 47% for βand 58% for  , and to desirable efficiency measures.  The 
model is estimated using 10,000 burn-in draws and 10,000 retained draws in the Gibbs 
Sampler.  The decision on the appropriate amount of burn-ins was guided by Geweke's 
(1992) convergence diagnostics. 
i γ
i γ
Estimation results are captured in Table 4.  The first two columns depict the 
posterior mean and standard deviation for each parameter.  The last column provides the 
numerical standard error (nse), a measure of simulation noise surrounding the posterior 
mean.  For a detailed discussion of this measure and its derivation see Moeltner et al., 
(2007) and Moeltner and Woodward (2009, footnote 12).    
We can immediately note from the table that all posterior densities for the price 
coefficients are located virtually entirely in the negative domain, as expected and 
required by the utility-theoretic framework.  The posterior mean for the income 
coefficient is also negative and close to zero.  This hints at an “inferior good” effect and 
suggests perhaps that more affluent anglers are less likely to fish the local waters, and 
instead travel to more exotic “blue ribbon” destinations for their angling pursuits.  
Similarly, the remaining demographic regressors gender = female, age, and presence of 
children have a negative fractional effect on trip demand, as judged by their respective 
posterior means.  22 
 
Interestingly, exclusive fly fishers exhibit a pronouncedly stronger visitation 
demand then anglers with hybrid techniques (our implicit baseline category).  Since fly 
fishing is generally associated with wading this raises further concerns regarding a 
possible introduction of the NZMS to the TCW watershed.  This demand effect is 
reversed for exclusive spin casters, although there exists considerable posterior noise 
surrounding this parameter.  
Perhaps the most important finding captured in the table are the pronouncedly 
negative posterior means coupled with relatively small posterior standard deviations for 
the mean effects of the two site characteristics “special regulations” and “winter closure”.  
Clearly, the prototypical angler strongly prefers sites with more relaxed fishing 
regulations and year-round access.  However, there also exists pronounced heterogeneity 
with respect to these preferences, as evidenced by the large posterior means for the 
variance components of these random effects (last three rows in the table).  This indicates 
that to a non- negligible share of anglers, approximately 15-20%, tighter fishing 
regulations actually constitute a desirable site feature.  It would be interesting to further 




  Our predictive measures of interest, captured in abstract form by  () ,| , g ij ij i xhθγ  in 
(9), are expected season trips per angler and seasonal welfare effects per angler, for the 
status quo and for the following three policy scenarios: (i) special regulations at all sites, 23 
 
(ii) winter closure at all sites, and (iii) both (i) and (ii).  The derivation of seasonal 
predictions for the status quo implicitly allows for the examination of an additional policy 
intervention (iv): closure of all sites.  For each scenario we derive trip and welfare 
predictions per river segment and for the total system. 
Although the IDS framework allows for the computation of utility-theoretic 
welfare measures such as Compensating Variation and Compensating Surplus (see e.g. 
Moeltner, 2003), we follow Hagerty and Moeltner (2005) and Shonkwiler and Englin 
(2005) and choose the simpler measure of Consumer Surplus (CS) given the negligible 
magnitude of income effects in our estimated model.   
Thus, we are interested in deriving PPDs for expected trips per site and for the 
entire system, i.e. 
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and Consumer Surplus per site and for the system at large, i.e. 
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Since the scenario settings are implemented via the  - vector in the link function, we add 
an s-subscript to this vector to indicate its applicability to a specific scenario, including 
h24 
 
the status quo.  For welfare effects, we also generate PPD’s for changes in CS by 
replacing 
s
ij λ  in (11) with 
0 s
ij ij λ λ − , where in this case the “0” superscript denotes the 
status quo.   
  The results of our predictive modeling are captured in Table 5.  As can be seen 
from the first block of columns the posterior means for our trip predictions to each site 
and the system at large are comparable in magnitude to our sample results in Table 2. We 
interpret this is as informal support for a reasonable fit of our model with the underlying 
data.  Under current regulatory conditions, the system generates over $1000 in seasonal 
welfare to the prototypical angler.  The largest contributions to this total come from 
sections T4, W3 and W4.  For T4 and W4 this is not surprising since they traverse 
population hubs and are two of only four segments with no access or technology 
restrictions (see Table 1).  Section W3 is the "trophy section" of the Walker river – a first 
class fishery with tight regulations that is especially popular amongst fly fishers.  As is 
evident by comparing seasonal welfare to seasonal trips, this segment generates much 
higher per-trip welfare (approx. $512) than the T4 and W4 segments (approx. $80-$120).   
  The most important finding captured in the Table are the dramatic welfare losses 
associated with any of the three policy scenarios.  For example, an introduction of special 
regulations at the currently more loosely regulated segments T1, T4, C1, C2, C4, W1, and 
W4 reduces system trips to 2.73 and system welfare to $590 per angler, for, respectively, 
a 54% and 43% reduction from the status quo.  Winter closures at current year-round 
sites (all except for C1, C2, and W1) has an even more pronounced effect on system-wide 
visitation and welfare, with respective reductions from the status quo of 79% and 71%.  25 
 
A joint implementation of both measures reduces per-angler seasonal trips to less than 
one, and seasonal welfare to $213.  This implies a 85% reduction in trips and a 78% loss 
in welfare compared to the status quo.  Losses in trip counts and consumer surplus are 
similarly pronounced for most individual sites, as shown in the top 12 rows of the table. 
  Figure 3 depicts the PPDs for losses in seasonal trips and CS for the prototypical 
angler for all three policy scenarios.  Inspection of the full PPDs allows for insights that 
cannot be easily conveyed in tabular form.  Specifically, it is clear from the figures that 
while the full range of losses (i.e. the support of the PPDs) is rather large (0  to 10 for 
trips, and $0 to $1000 for CS), the bulk of the probability mass for these densities locates 
above a much tighter range, approximately 3-5 for trips and $300 – $600 for welfare, 
depending on scenario.  While the PPDs for the three scenarios largely overlap, it is still 
evident from the figure that the density for “winter closure” is more pronouncedly 
skewed to the left than the PPD for “special regulations”.  Naturally, the PPD for the 
combined effect (labeled “both”) in the figure has the “thickest” right hand tail, and the 
“slimmest” left hand tail of all three densities for both trips and Consumer Surplus.   
  Table 6 provides a summary of estimated aggregate losses in day trips, welfare, 
and expenditures for the entire population of anglers (i.e. the sampling frame of 28,331 
individuals who held a Nevada fishing license in 2004 and resided in Counties 
surrounding the TCW system).  The figures under the “mean” columns in the table are 
derived by multiplying the mean of the corresponding per-angler PPD by the total 
number of anglers.  The entries in the “low” and “up” columns represent, respectively, 
the 95% numerical confidence interval around the posterior mean, computed as the mean 26 
 
+/- 1.96 times the numerical standard error (see e.g. Moeltner et al., 2007 ). This 
confidence interval conveys the extent of simulation noise surrounding the mean 
estimate.  The expenditure losses have to be interpreted as upper bounds, since they are 
based on the underlying assumption that losses in trips translate directly into complete 
leaks of per-trip expenditures (using the sample average of $65/person) out of the 
regional economy. 
  The table shows that expected total losses in welfare to regional anglers can be 
staggering, ranging from $11 million to $20 million, if system-wide special regulations 
and / or winter closures are employed as a policy tool against the NZMS. A year-round 
closure of the fishery would lead to expected welfare losses of close to $30 million 
annually.  Importantly, welfare losses are two to three times higher than expenditure 
losses, which range from $6 million to $11 million for any of the considered policy 
interventions.  Combining both sources of economic loss, the total direct economic 
impact of these policy measures is estimated at $17 - $40 million, depending on the 
intervention scenario.  This also implies that the current economic value of the TCW 
fishery exceeds $40 million when recreational welfare effects are included.   
  Given the magnitude of these expected losses from the type of policy 
interventions that would most likely be used as control measures following a snail 
infestation, a strong argument can be made in support of outlays for preemptive 
strategies, most notably those that lead to enhanced public awareness.  Even if only 
individual segments or rivers within the TCM system are targeted with changes in access 27 
 
or fishing regulations, associated welfare losses will likely far outweigh any reasonable 
outlays on preemptive measures.   
 
V) Conclusion 
  This study combines a utility-theoretic system demand model of recreational 
angling with a Bayesian econometric framework to estimate changes in day trips and 
consumer surplus associated with regulatory interventions in the Truckee-Carson-Walker 
watershed in the eastern foothills of the central Sierra Nevada region.  We cast our 
analysis within the threat of an infestation of this watershed by the New Zealand Mud 
Snail.  The policy scenarios we examine are of the types that are currently considered as 
viable control interventions, and that have been implemented elsewhere in the past to 
combat a snail invasion. 
  The TCW system has traditionally been an important recreational fishery.  Not 
surprisingly, our estimated losses in day trips and corresponding economic welfare are of 
considerable magnitude for any of the simulated policy interventions.  To a somewhat 
minor extent, this also holds for expected losses to the regional economy in the form of 
foregone fishing expenditures.  Overall, our results lend strong support for investments in 
preemptive policy measures against the NZMS, such as public awareness campaigns via 
grassroots operations and public outreach via all branches of the media.  
  It should be noted that our analysis focuses exclusively on day trips by anglers to 
regional rivers.  In other words, we do not consider multi-day trips, trips by any other 
recreational contingent, and trips to any of the lakes connected by the three rivers.  These 28 
 
include virtually all large lakes of Northern Nevada (some shared with California) such 
as Tahoe, Pyramid, Lahontan, Topaz, and Walker.  A broader analysis based on more 
extensive recreation data (including boating and other water sports) would be required to 
estimate expected snail-induced losses for this wider “recreational playground” , to this 
larger underlying population of stakeholders, and for trips of varying length.  It can be 
safely assumed that the estimates of economic losses reported in this study would pale in 
comparison to welfare and expenditure losses to the regional economy if, in addition to 
the three rivers, any of these lakes were affected by access restrictions or other snail-
induced regulatory changes.   
  Fortunately, TCW resource managers still have the option of taking preemptive 
measures to avoid a snail infestation without limiting site access.  However, the snails’ 
current geographic expansion and the wading-intensive angling techniques preferred by a 
considerable share of TCW anglers stress the imminence of such an infestation.   
Hopefully, the findings summarized in this study will lend ammunition to local managing 
agencies in their quest for State and federal funding to enhance public awareness on and 
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Table 1: Basic Site Characteristics 
River Section  State  Season  Regulations 
       
Truckee T1  CA  all  year  general 
 T2  CA  all  year  special* 
 T3  NV  all  year  special* 
 T4  NV  all  year  general 
       
Carson  C1  CA  Apr. 21 - Nov. 15 general 
  C2  CA  Apri.21 - Nov. 15 general 
 C3  CA  all  year  special** 
 C4  NV  all  year  general 
       
Walker  W1  CA  Apri.21 - Nov. 15 general 
 W2  CA  all  year  special* 
 W3  NV  all  year  special** 
 W4  NV  all  year  general 
              
all special regulations = artificial lures 
*bag and size limits 
**catch & release 
In 2004, general regulations in Nevada were “any hour of the day or night”, and “5 trout / day” without size 
or lure restrictions.  In California, general regulations implied “one hour before sunrise to one hour after 
sunset”, and “5 trout/day, with no more than 10 trout in possession” without size or lure restrictions.34 
 
Table 2: Sample Statistics 
 
attribute  mean / percent  median  std. 
      
female 16.15%  -  - 
age 52.31  53  13.98 
years of schooling  14.3  14  2.4 
income $81,800  $70,000  $58,715 
HH with children  35.39%  -  - 
CA resident  1.63%  -  - 
      
CA fishing license holder in 2004  33.76%  -  - 
Fishing experience (years)  37.97  40  16.58 
fly fish only  13.79%  -  - 
spin cast only  43.74%  -  - 
no bait restrictions is important  31.58%  -  - 
keeping fish is important  46.46%  -  - 
per-daytrip expenditures  $65.41  $55.00  $49.87 
      
Knows NZMS  27.52%  -  - 
wades in water  56.62%  -  - 
Fished an infected river in 2004  13.97%  -  - 
      
N = 551       35 
 
Table 3: Distances and Trips 
 
  Distances*  Trips 
           Per individual    All individuals 
Section  Mean  Min.  Max.  Std.    Mean  Min. Max. Std.    visits% of river % system
                         
T1  71.3 5.1  237.9  39.4    0.19  0  30  1.62  107 5.4%  3.2% 
T2 66.7  13.2  242.0  37.5    0.22  0  20  1.25    119 6.0%  3.5% 
T3  50.9 5.1  254.6  40.0    0.83  0  40  2.80  458 23.0%  13.6% 
T4 45.9  2.3  264.9  36.1    2.38  0  250  13.08   1311 65.7%  39.0% 
Truckee  - - - -    3.62 0  250  13.92   1995 100.0% 59.3% 
                         
C1  70.1 8.5  257.0  38.1    0.22  0  10  1.00  123 20.2%  3.7% 
C2 73.5  11.3  264.4  37.1    0.14  0  10  0.85    79  13.0%  2.3% 
C3  69.5 3.7  256.8  38.6    0.14  0  20  1.06  78  12.8%  2.3% 
C4  57.4 6.0  231.7  27.0    0.60  0  40  2.89  329 54.0%  9.8% 
Carson  - - - -    1.11 0 40  3.68    609 100.0% 18.1% 
                         
W1 80.7  29.7  265.6  30.0    0.31  0  23  1.79    172 22.7%  5.1% 
W2 100.9  33.5  276.0  30.6    0.21 0 50  2.30    115 15.2%  3.4% 
W3 94.1  26.0  268.5  30.4    0.32  0  20  1.52    176 23.2%  5.2% 
W4 82.1  24.7  252.3  27.3    0.54  0  20  1.74    296 39.0%  8.8% 
Walker  - - - -    1.38 0 85  5.10    759 100.0% 22.6% 
                         
System - - - -    6.10  0  250  15.65   3363 -  100.0%
                                       
*One way, miles                        36 
 
Table 4: Estimation Results 
   Hierarchical  Poisson 
variable   mean  std.  nse 
        
fixed effects        
constant   3.166  0.284  0.013 
price T1    -0.072  0.002  0.000 
price T2    -0.019  0.001  0.000 
price T3    -0.009  0.001  0.000 
price T4    -0.011  0.001  0.000 
price C1    -0.006  0.001  0.000 
price C2    -0.006  0.001  0.000 
price C3    -0.007  0.000  0.000 
price C4    -0.008  0.000  0.000 
price W1    -0.002  0.001  0.000 
price W2    -0.002  0.000  0.000 
price W3    -0.002  0.000  0.000 
price W4    -0.004  0.000  0.000 
gender   -0.772  0.091  0.002 
age   -0.025  0.013  0.001 
age^2   0.000  0.000  0.000 
flyfishing only    0.209  0.075  0.002 
spin casting only    -0.021  0.052  0.001 
HH income    -0.002  0.001  0.000 
years of fishing    0.019  0.002  0.000 
children in HH    -0.212  0.053  0.001 
RE means       
special regulations    -3.938  0.242  0.013 
winter closure    -5.833  0.612  0.081 
RE var/cov       
var(special)   7.460  1.036  0.049 
cov   5.894  1.124  0.059 
var(winter)   11.329  2.344  0.201 
nse = numerical standard error / RE = random effects 
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Table 5: Trip and Welfare Predictions 
 
  Status Quo  Special Regulations  Winter Closure  Both 
 Trips    CS    Trips  CS   Trips  CS    Trips  CS 
Section mean  (nse)     mean  (nse)  mean (nse)    mean  (nse)  mean (nse)    mean  (nse)  mean (nse)  mean  (nse) 
                                    
T1  0.23 0.00    3.15  0.01  0.04  0.00  0.61  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.24  0.01  0.01 0.00  0.17  0.01 
T2  0.21 0.01   11.10  0.30  0.21  0.01  11.10  0.30  0.06  0.00  3.12  0.16  0.06 0.00  3.12  0.16 
T3  0.60 0.02   67.21  1.83  0.60  0.02  67.21  1.83  0.17  0.01  19.04  0.98  0.17 0.01  19.04  0.98 
T4  2.27 0.00   200.21  0.36  0.43  0.01  38.44  1.05  0.17  0.01  15.04  0.51  0.12 0.01  10.95  0.57 
                                    
C1  0.11 0.00   19.17  0.65  0.08  0.00  14.38  0.75  0.11  0.00  19.17  0.65  0.08 0.00  14.38  0.75 
C2  0.08 0.00   13.85  0.46  0.06  0.00  10.26  0.53  0.08  0.00  13.85  0.46  0.06 0.00  10.26  0.53 
C3  0.15 0.00   22.00  0.60  0.15  0.00  22.00  0.60  0.04  0.00  6.26  0.33  0.04 0.00  6.26  0.33 
C4  0.59 0.00   72.00  0.18  0.11  0.00  13.85  0.38  0.04  0.00  5.38  0.18  0.03 0.00  3.89  0.20 
                                    
W1  0.15 0.01   79.11  2.67  0.12  0.01  59.23  3.14  0.15  0.01  79.11  2.67  0.12 0.01  59.23  3.14 
W2  0.20 0.01   81.74  2.24  0.20  0.01  81.74  2.24  0.06  0.00  23.13  1.21  0.06 0.00  23.13  1.21 
W3  0.31 0.01   158.71  4.33  0.31  0.01  158.71  4.33  0.09  0.01  45.18  2.36  0.09 0.01  45.18  2.36 
W4  0.63 0.00   177.39  0.40  0.12  0.00  33.97  0.92  0.05  0.00  13.31  0.46  0.03 0.00  9.63  0.50 
                                    
System 5.95 0.06    1031.78 16.08  2.73  0.08  590.05 18.37  1.24  0.05  297.54 12.15  0.88 0.05  212.18  11.09
                                                                 
All values are per individual, per season 
nse = numerical standard error 
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Table 6: Economic Impacts 
 
    Loss in Trips (1000s)    Loss in Welfare (millions)  
Loss in Expenditures 
(millions) 
      mean  low  up     mean  low  up    mean  low   up 
                     
Special 
regulations 
  84.51 82.90 86.12   $10.58 $10.32 $10.84   $5.53  $5.42  $5.63 
Winter 
closure 
 119.59  118.14  121.03  $17.14 $16.84 $17.44   $7.82  $7.73  $7.92 
Both   130.97  129.75  132.20  $19.92 $19.61 $20.23   $8.57  $8.49  $8.65 
Year-round 
Closure 
 168.57  165.24  171.90  $29.23 $28.34 $30.12  $11.03 $10.81 $11.24 




Figure 1: The TCW watershed and known infestations of the NZMS in the West 
 
 
Dotted circle = TCW watershed 
Black dots = known infestations of the NZMS 
Source for base map: Montana State University NZMS web site 
http://www.esg.montana.edu/aim/mollusca/nzms/status.html40 
 
Figure 2: The TCW Watershed and the 12 Fishing Segments 
 
(map courtesy of the Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology)41 
 
Figure 3: Posterior Distribution of Trip and Welfare Losses 
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